Need a Push?  Restoring EU Influence in the Balkans by Henry, Cassidy
The credibility of the European Union (EU) is declining in the 
Western Balkans. Candidate states in the region see the date 
for accession negotiations fading further into the future; they 
now doubt whether they will ever join the EU.  If this hope 
is dashed, these countries could easily relapse into national-
istic rhetoric and action against other states, as happened af-
ter the breakup of Yugoslavia or, more recently, with Kosovo. 
Respected international relations scholars, Tanja Borzel and 
Thomas Risse, pointed out in 2011 that the cause of this de-
cline varies from enlargement fatigue within the EU to the 
sheer number of standards  required of acceding states. Many 
current EU members are beginning to question if the Balkans 
(or any other country) should be admitted to the union, and 
they do so publicly. 
Currently, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yu-
goslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)1, Kosovo, Monte-
negro, and Serbia wait at various stages of accession. These 
countries have been working towards EU membership since 
1995. The EU Commission on Enlargement has recommend-
ed since 2009  that FYROM start negotiations to join the or-
ganization.  Albania received a recommendation from the 
Commission to start accession negotiations in October 2013. 
The other candidate states have not yet received permission 
to  begin these negotiations; rather, they are still heavily criti-
cized for not meeting EU accession standards.
Simon Schunz, a researcher at the Leuven Centre for Global 
Governance Studies defines influence as “the modification of 
one or several actors’ behavior, beliefs or preferences by acts 
of another actor exerted for the purpose of reaching the later 
actor’s aims.” In the case of the Western Balkans, the EU’s in-
fluence is mostly imposed upon the states prior to EU mem-
bership through conditionality. Applicant states must meet 
stringent requirements  —conditions— to join the the EU. 
That conditionality is both a positive and a negative. If the 
countries complete it all, they get to join the EU; if they fail to 
complete even one part, they can not join the EU. 
Implementation of the conditions imposed by the EU is based 
on individual states’ perceptions towards the EU. The EU’s 
ability to modify their behavior, the hallmark of influence, 
will be limited in states choosing not to pursue EU member-
ship.  Furthermore, when  membership  is not a possibility, 
the EU loses its ability to press politicians to choose reform. 
Politicians facing tough elections at home may choose not 
to introduce necessary but politically difficult reforms in 
order to keep their positions. On the other hand, they also 
want to claim responsibility for their country joining the EU. 
The Western Balkan states’ modification of internal domestic 
structures due to  the conditions of EU accession is a prime 
example of EU influence. 
In order to join the EU, states must fulfill the Copenhagen 
Criteria and enlargement principles, as well as adopt all prior 
EU legislation. The overarching themes of the Copenhagen 
Criteria are democracy, rule of law, human rights, respect for 
and protection of minorities and a competitive market econo-
my. Gergana Noutcheva, an Assistant Professor at Maastricht 
University, declared in 2011 that conditionality of EU mem-
bership is “not only [focused] on achieving high standards 
of democratic and economic governance (the Copenhagen 
Criteria), but also on the consolidation of statehood in the 
[Western Balkans], both external (state borders) and internal 
(autonomous governance).” The states that have joined the 
EU since the fall of the Soviet Union reformed their laws to 
align with those of the EU. In the Western Balkans, the focus 
of the EU has been on domestic liberalization and interstate 
cooperation, such as in Kosovo and Serbia.
Many of these required changes involve complex domes-
tic bargaining and strict rules that result only in long-term 
benefit. Some politicians see the admittance to the EU as the 
whole purpose of changing the rules; while the changes im-
plement better governance in the present, they do not gain 
immediate admittance to the EU.  Many changes are consid-
ered extremely radical policy changes for these former com-
munist states. The stringent conditionality imposed upon the 
Western Balkans adds to already stressed systems, in some 
cases overwhelming them. Other theorists have suggested 
that membership prospects need to be 
credible in order directly to influence 
institutional change and overcome do-
mestic opposition.  
Some argue that any criticism from 
Southeast Europe represents mounting 
dissatisfaction in the time lapse be-
tween application and joining the EU, 
rather than a sign of waning commit-
ment.  Alarmingly, the increasing do-
mestic skepticism regarding EU acces-
sion could prove catastrophic for both 
the EU and the region. The Western 
Balkans have been the prominent exam-
ple of successful EU influence for some 
time. If each country fails to meet the 
specified targets and still gains entry to 
the EU,  the region has the potential to 
discredit the entire logic of condition-
ality.  Some argue the cases of Bulgaria 
and Romania illustrate this potential. If 
such “conditionality as policy change 
fails,” the EU will face larger problems with the legitimacy of 
their accession standards.
The most recent instance of EU enlargement occurred earli-
er this year, with the admission of Croatia.  Previously, there 
had been a five-year gap since the last enlargement. Since 
the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, the Western 
Balkans are now completely surrounded by the EU, further 
pressuring them eventually to join the community or risk suf-
fering economic damage. These countries already desire to be 
admitted to the EU, as shown by 4 of the 6 submitting applica-
tions amid the accession of Croatia and Slovenia. 
Yet domestic opinion regarding accession is souring.  Citizens 
of the candidate states question whether their countries will 
ever join the EU. Many doubt the necessary changes to their 
domestic law are worthwhile.  For FYROM, the biggest im-
pediment to its accession is a quarrel with Greece over the 
right to the name “Macedonia.” However, resolving the issue 
would require leaders to spend political capital on a subject 
on which they disagree with their voters. As FYROM feels the 
effects of the global economic crisis, its citizens are beginning 
to lessen the capital politicians would need to expand. Mace-
donians’ greater desire for economic relief than for political 
grandstanding spurred negotiations with Greece toward the 
beginning of a high-level dialogue over the past year. 
The freefall in the accession process’s credibility has only 
recently begun to reverse. Today, we see the emergence of 
high-level accession dialogues (HLAD) injecting new dyna-
mism into the accession process, thereby strengthening confi-
dence and boosting accession prospects 
of the candidate states. Creating a new 
way of doing business implies that the 
old way was no longer working. The 
Commission recognized its credibil-
ity had declined in the region and the 
HLAD were a direct response to re-
store it. Conversely, the HLAD could 
be a novel and dynamic approach to the 
stagnant regional integration process, as 
they could reflect a tacit acknowledge-
ment of the lack of progress regarding 
integration. Prior to 2012, the Europe-
an Commission simply continued its 
recommendation that FYROM begin 
accession negotiations, despite aware-
ness that Greece would veto the pro-
posal. The HLAD began in 2012, and 
FYROM began to take concrete steps 
to implement reforms and solve the dis-
pute with Greece. It was this “proof ” of 
the EU’s dedication to the eventual ac-
cession of FYROM that persuaded FY-
ROM to modify their behavior and pursue the policy changes 
that they had been delaying. Through concrete steps, Europe 
showed its ability to restore declining influence over prospec-
tive member states. 
Little scholarship exists on the influence of EU conditionality 
and its implementation in candidate countries.  This is an area 
of study the expansion of which may provide valuable future 
insight. Use of Schunz’s paradigm for assessment influence 
informs this research providing a valuable baseline delineat-
ing what influence is. Current evidence indicates that EU in-
fluence is decline in the Western Balkans. Unless they begin 
to implement more strategies like the HLAD, EU influence 
could decrease past a critical point. If that point is passed, the 
EU’s ability to stabilize the region could be endangered, as 
well as the reputation of the EU itself. 
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While they watch their neighbors, many countries in 
the Western Balkans must await their chance to join 
the EU and the opportunities that could bring.
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1 The use of “Kosovo” or “FYROM” reflect the usage of the EU and not the 
personal views of the author.
The Balkans have historically been divided.
